Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
Engineering Management & Systems
Engineering Faculty Publications

Engineering Management & Systems
Engineering

2009

Rapid Sensor Technology: A Risk and System Complexity
Analyses of Early Detection of Influenza-Like-Illnesses
Cesar Ariel Pinto
Old Dominion University

Ipek Bozkurt
Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/emse_fac_pubs
Part of the Health and Medical Administration Commons, Respiratory Tract Diseases Commons, and
the Systems Engineering Commons

Original Publication Citation
Pinto, C. A., & Bozkurt, I. (2009). Rapid sensor technology: A risk and system complexity analyses of early
detection of influenza-like-illnesses. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 6(1), 20
pp., Article 86. https://doi.org/10.2202/1547-7355.1596

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Engineering Management & Systems Engineering at
ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Engineering Management & Systems Engineering
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@odu.edu.

Journal of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management
Volume 6, Issue 1

2009

Article 86

Rapid Sensor Technology: A Risk and System
Complexity Analyses of Early Detection of
Influenza-Like-Illnesses
C. Ariel Pinto, Old Dominion University
Ipek Bozkurt, Old Dominion University

Recommended Citation:
Pinto, C. Ariel and Bozkurt, Ipek (2009) "Rapid Sensor Technology: A Risk and System
Complexity Analyses of Early Detection of Influenza-Like-Illnesses," Journal of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1, Article 86.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol6/iss1/86
DOI: 10.2202/1547-7355.1596
©2009 Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.
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Complexity Analyses of Early Detection of
Influenza-Like-Illnesses
C. Ariel Pinto and Ipek Bozkurt

Abstract
The development of effective and reliable methods to defend the nation against biological
terrorism remains an urgent challenge to researchers in the areas of risk, bio-defense, public
health, and emergency medicine. The emerging threat of the avian flu pandemic also highlights the
unpreparedness of our nation's health care system to meet a highly contagious and infectious
disease outbreak. The implementation of a rapid sensor technology for early detection of
influenza-like-illness provides possible opportunities, as well as problems. Bounding and defining
such a complex problem is one of the first challenges this research addresses. Approaching this
problem from various perspectives such as risk management, critical infrastructures and
emergency medicine proves to be a valid strategy for an efficient solution. After defining the
problem and laying out a strategy, discussions on possible tools and techniques for the solution of
the problem is presented in this paper, together with the compounding sources of and issues with
complexity.
KEYWORDS: biosensor, critical infrastructure, biodefense, risk, pandemic, complex
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INTRODUCTION

In 2006, Old Dominion University (ODU) and Eastern Virginia Medical School
(EVMS) conducted a study on a future generation of rapid sensor technology
(RST) that could detect impending flu-like pandemic and related factors, and
analyzed the implications of implementing such a sensor technology in terms of
improved effectiveness. The study established that the implementation of sensor
systems can have an impact on standard operation procedures in the medical,
business, government and military infrastructures (Pinto et al., 2007).
The main issue that is being dealt in this paper is the potential use of RST
as surveillance tool of influenza-like-illnesses (ILI) in emergency rooms, and the
problems of complexity that arise with this implementation. The impacts of a
possible pandemic have been researched within different perspectives, including
emotional effects (Reissman et al., 2006), cultural differences (Peng, 2008),
planning (Thompson and Gorder, 2007) and management (Thorson and Ekdahl,
2005; Scanlon, et al., 2007), among others. In the Pandemic Planning Update
(2006) given by the Department of Health and Human Services, five primary
objectives are stated: 1) monitoring disease spread to support rapid response, 2)
developing vaccines and vaccine production capacity, 3) stockpiling antivirals and
other countermeasures, 4) coordinating federal, state and local preparation, and
finally, 5) enhancing outreach and communications planning. The first priority
(i.e. monitoring and rapid response) is the main focus of this research, with the
implementation of the RST. As noted in the same report, early detection provides
the opportunity to respond, to attempt containment and to quickly gain the virus
samples necessary for the development of a true pandemic vaccine.
The main focus, as stated above, is on the effectiveness of the RST that is
currently being developed in hopes of overcoming the obstacles of late detection
of ILI. The development of the sensor technology is expected to move in three
major directions: 1) Towards more direct detection of an influenza-type virus in
patient samples, 2) towards more remote sensors in the medical exam and waiting
rooms, and 3) towards more strategic and non-traditional deployment of sensors
such as public and high-traffic spaces in an urban setting.
However, aside from the main topic of the study - the implications of
implementing the RST - the researchers also realized the high degree of
complexity of the problem. This realization led them to look closer into the
research methodologies that were applied and how these methodologies dealt with
the complexity and the nature of the problem. RST has an impact on every phase
of a pandemic attack system. With so many varieties of entities, such as doctors,
patients, labs, emergency procedures, both state and federal health departments, it
is undeniable that this is a system has a varying degrees of complexity in each
level, has a high degree of emergence and is non-trivial to analyze - as such is a
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wicked problem (Rittel and Weber, 1973). The complexity is not only initiated by
the variety of components within the larger system, but also because of the high
levels of interrelations between these components. The stream of events starting
from the first instance when a patient walks into an emergency room, the
detection of the influenza virus and to the state-wide high-level alerts, have
implications that go beyond their boundaries.
There are several intersecting domains of knowledge in the RST study.
Among these are risk management, epidemiology, emergency management,
public health, and organizational behavior. All of these domains of knowledge are
worthy of being examined with regards to complexity and wicked problems.
Looking at all these domains from the risk managers’ view can provide an
encompassing discussion possibly not allowable if viewed from any other
domain. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section will
present an overview on the different pandemic periods and their related phases.
Following this, implementation of the rapid sensor technology will be presented.
Having established an understanding of what constitutes a pandemic, why dealing
with such an event and implementing an RST can be considered as a risk activity
is discussed in the next section. How this risk management activities and the
complexity of implementing such a technology can be seen as a wicked problem
is discussed in this section as well. After discussing the systems approach that is
necessary to deal with such problems, and presenting a discussion on the multidisciplinary nature of the problem at hand, effective resource allocation is
presented in the next section. The conclusion presents a summary of the
highlights of this research, as well as the possible future research areas that may
arise.
2

PHASES OF A PANDEMIC

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), a pandemic is an epidemic
on a global scale. An influenza pandemic, for instance, occurs when a virus that
may cause severe diseases spreads among humans. The WHO states that each
country, city and area must have a pandemic preparedness plan, since the impact
of such an event is not only a health crisis, but also a social issue that may have
disastrous implications. Figure 1 represents the main pandemic phases (compiled
from WHO), together with their levels of risk, conditions and the actions
necessary to be taken.
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Pre Pandemic Period

The Pre-Pandemic period consists of three main surveillances: The Passive
Surveillance (PS), Active Sentinel Physician Surveillance (ASP) and Laboratory
Surveillance (LS). In PS, the information is collected from the physicians, persons
in charge of the medical care and from the directors of laboratories. The
information is then reported to the local health department and then to the state
health department. The reports from the state health department are tabulated on a
weekly basis and forwarded to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC).
During the ASP surveillance, the physicians volunteer to monitor and
report the number of Influenza-Like-Illnesses (ILI) to the local health department
and then to the State Health Department (DSI). Following this, the DSI classifies
this information and tabulates it to find out the level of Influenza.
The Laboratory Surveillance helps identify the type of influenza virus
strains and prepare a vaccine for the same virus. They then provide this
information to the local and state health departments.
2.2

Inter Pandemic Period

The Inter-pandemic phase is a function of pathogenicity in animals and humans,
domestic or wildlife, localized or widespread, etc. There are two phases in the
inter-pandemic period: In Phase One, there are no reports of humans being
infected due to an animal influenza virus circulating among animals; and if they
are found or are present in animals, then the action taken is to strengthen the
preparedness at global, regional, national and sub national levels.
In Phase Two, there is a potential threat for a pandemic if an animal
influenza virus which circulates among animals has been reported to have caused
infection in humans. If that is the case, then the necessary action is trying to
minimize transmission risk to humans, detecting and reporting such transmission
rapidly if it occurs.
2.3

Pandemic Alert Period

Pandemic alert period is a function of the rate of transmission, geographical
location, spread and severity of illnesses, and it is based on the risk of a pandemic.
There are three main phases in this period: In the first phase (Phase 3 overall), if
human infection with a new subtype virus is found, but there is no human to
human spread, this possesses a no transmission risk. In this phase, there may be
limited human-to-human transmission under certain circumstances, such as a
close contact between an infected person and an unprotected caregiver. However,
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such circumstances do not indicate the transmissibility of the virus among humans
to the extent that in may cause a pandemic. If at all transmission is found, in rare
instances, it then spreads to a close contact. As a result, for Phase 3, the measures
taken are early detection, rapid characterization of new virus subtype, notification
and response to additional cases. According to the newly revised 2009 Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness and Response Guide developed by WHO, pandemic
influenza viruses may arise through either genetic reassortment, in which genes
from animal and human influenza viruses mix together to create a human-animal
virus, or through genetic mutation, in which genes in an animal virus change,
which allows the virus to infect humans and transmits easily among them.
The second phase (Phase Four overall) is considered to have limited
transmission if the virus subtype is found in small clusters with limited human to
human transmission but spread is highly localized. In this phase, the virus is not
well adapted to humans. Therefore, the new virus subtype within the local focus
are should be contained or the spread should be delayed to gain time in order to
implement preparedness measures, including vaccine development.
In the third and last phase (Phase Five overall), there is a substantial
pandemic risk, i.e. significant transmission but not fully transmissible if the
clusters get larger but the human to human spread is still localized, suggesting that
the virus is becoming increasingly better adapted to humans. During this phase
the efforts to contain or delay spread are maximized in efforts to possibly avert a
pandemic. This also provides enough time to implement pandemic response
measures.
2.4

Pandemic and Post Pandemic Period

In this period, there is increased and sustained transmission and the impact of the
pandemic needs to be minimized. Once this stage is reached, suspicious situations
are constantly checked, and a high level of alert is maintained.
3

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RAPID SENSOR TECHNOLOGY

In order to identify and discuss the issues of complexity in this research, it is
crucial to have an understanding on how the sensor technology would effect the
epidemic/pandemic phases. The effectiveness of the sensor technology may be
validated if proper context for the applicability and use of sensor technology can
be provided. Benefits in both clinical and operational areas (such as staffing) will
be more apparent once the technology has been placed into the
epidemic/pandemic phases.
One of the most important issues WHO deals with during an influenza
pandemic is preparedness planning; more specifically, how to enable countries to
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be prepared and how to make them recognize and manage an influenza pandemic.
The planning aspect becomes crucial here, especially when it comes to reducing
transmissions of the pandemic virus, decreasing the infected cases, maintaining
essential services, and finally reducing the economic and social impact of a
pandemic (WHO, 2009). Simulation models on how an influenza pandemic would
affect a community and national services can include estimates of impact
measures. Incorporating the suggested Rapid Sensor Technology in such
simulation models can result in more accurate estimates in all levels of emergency
preparedness and planning.
Figure 2 represents the Pre-Pandemic Influenza Surveillance Activities
and the Pandemic Alert period, where the Rapid Sensor Technology is placed.
The patient arrives to the hospital with some symptoms of high
temperature and one of the 3 signs: either cough, sore throat or dyspnea. The
patient is then taken and admitted into the ER (at time t = 0); the physician then
does the required checkup. Once the patient is admitted to the ER and is checked
by the physician, he or she will be treated under two categories, clinical criteria
and epidemiologic criteria. If the patient is in clinical criteria but not in
epidemiologic criteria, then he/she is treated clinically and re-evaluated. If he/she
falls in both clinical and epidemiologic criteria, then certain actions are taken, like
implementing precautions, notifying local health departments, collecting and
sending specimen to state lab (DCLS), evaluating alternative diagnoses, initiating
antiviral treatment, and identifying potentially exposed contacts. If the tests come
out to be negative, then a specialist should be consulted, as well as state health
department and CDC, as there is a chance of false negative (FN-infected,
undetected) results. These FN results are the source of the biggest concern, since
the infected individuals are not isolated and treated (Malone et al, 2009). As
Bravta et al (2004) state, performing confirmatory tests after the completion of
initial tests could minimize both false-negative and false-positive results. This is
the reason why a specialist is consulted, together with the CDC; to eliminate the
chance of any false results. Also if alternative diagnosis is established, antiviral
treatment is discontinued. If the tests come out to be positive, then the antiviral
treatment is continued, as well as infection control precautions (isolation etc.).
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However, in this research, the Rapid Sensor Technology (RST) is
introduced between the stage when the patient enters the ER and the physician
check up. With this step, information will be obtained if a virus is present and, if
the RST is more specific, the kind of virus may also be ascertained. This will
reduce the detection time, which otherwise would be significantly longer if the
traditional procedure is followed. This will also eventually reduce the patients
visiting the ER as with early detection the tendency is to narrow the spread if not
completely eliminate it. Once the virus is detected (either just its presence or its
type) the information can be sent to the required department for further treatment
or procedures, which is performed after the isolation of the patient. The patient
might not be detected as an individual with a virus, but in a group, even if a single
person is infected, the RST will alert the necessary personnel and all the patients
will have to be isolated for further treatment. If no virus is detected, then the
regular procedure is followed.
3.1

Strategic Effects of the RST on the General Plan

The first and the highest level of Pandemic hierarchy that will be affected with the
implementation of the RST is the strategic level. Placing the RST in the Pandemic
Alert Period will change the detection cycle. As discussed in the previous section,
the time between admission to the ER and the initial physician check and then
detection of a virus will significantly decrease with the addition of the RST.
Instead of waiting for laboratory results for detection of a certain virus, the RST
will detect the presence of any ILI and will set off another cycle, which brings the
total effects into the next level.
3.2

Procedural Effects of RST on the Health Organization

Together with the strategic changes, there will be significant changes in the
procedures of related departments, once the RST is integrated as a main
component of the department. For instance, if the RST is placed in an Emergency
Room of a hospital, the ER should have an isolation plan should there be any
virus detections. Therefore, in addition to the many emergency procedures the ER
has, new procedures and systems should be developed and implemented. The
standard operation procedures would also need to be modified to accommodate
the actual implementation of the RST. The placement of rapid sensors would
change the planning layout of the emergency rooms, and other areas. Therefore,
the modifications in the procedures should take into account the physical
placement of the RST, as well as the implications on how to proceed once such
technology is implemented.
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The Department of Health and Human Services provided a checklist to the
Medical Offices and Clinics (2006), which identified the key areas for pandemic
influenza planning. The first component of this checklist is the structure for
planning and decision making, which ensures that the organization has
incorporated the pandemic influenza into the emergency management planning,
and also makes sure that a person has been assigned for coordinating preparedness
planning for the practice or the organization. The second component of the list is
to develop a written pandemic influenza plan. This is another addition to the
procedural effects under discussion. Not only would there be strategic change in
the bigger picture of an emergency flu pandemic, the smaller component, being
the ER, will need to update their procedures according to new installments.
3.3

Operational Effects of RST on Internal Components

The implications of having the RST at the lowest level bring the discussion to
operational concerns. Operational problems are an extension of the discussion in
the previous section about procedural issues. Together with the new procedures
that need to be developed and implemented, operational issues need to be dealt
with. One of the first new additions to the ER would be new personnel, necessary
to possibly collect and analyze the signals from the RST and interpret the data
according to specifications. The RST is assumed to have different levels of
detection. Whether the type or amount of the detected virus is sufficient enough
for isolation of the ER or the implementation of other procedures will be
dependent on the analysis from the sensor by the related analyst.
Another important component that has been advised by the Department of
Health and Human Services is the creation of a system to monitor and review
influenza activity in patients cared for by clinical staff (i.e. weekly or daily
number of patients calling or presenting to the office or clinic with ILI).
Implementation of such a system would correspond to the RST and data obtained
from the sensor.
The implementation and use of the RST will also bring more interaction
between departments. Once virus is detected, the analyst will need to have the
necessary communication channels with the ER and the laboratories so that the
procedures to be followed can be implemented smoothly. This has also been an
important part in the planning checklist. Development of a communication plan,
together with identifying and arranging contact persons for external
communication will improve the relations between the office, organization or
hospital in focus and the external departments. Both internal and external
coordination efforts are crucial in operationalizing the RST.
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THE RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH

The problem of preventing a flu-like pandemic using improved RST is, to most
extent, a large-scale risk management activity. This is due to the fact that the
overall goal of the RST study is to minimize the risk of flu-type pandemic. This
brings the discussion to an important topic - what is risk? The Society for Risk
Analysis describes risk as “…the potential for realization of unwanted, adverse
consequences.” And thus, to manage risk involves all the activities commonly
associated with managerial process, except that the explicit objective is to
minimize risk. On the other hand, the generally accepted quantitative definition of
risk is:
Risk = f (likelihood of the significant threat or hazard scenarios, given the
scenario the ability of the target to withstand the threat or hazard confronted, and
the magnitude and type of worst reasonable consequences)
Since the seminal work of Kaplan (1997), risk has often been expressed as
a function of the descriptions of the complete set of scenarios, and their respective
probabilities of frequency and likelihood of various consequences. For the
practitioners, risk management approach (RMA) can be best described in terms of
the process in search for answers to a set of six questions (Kaplan and Garrick,
1981, and Haimes, 1981):
• Question 1: What can go wrong?
• Question 2: What is the likelihood that it could go wrong?
• Question 3: What are the consequences?
• Question 4: What can be done?
• Question 5: What are the tradeoffs?
• Question 6: What are the impacts on future options?
In the context of RST, some answers to the above questions are obvious
while others are completely perplexing for researchers: What can go wrong - a
catastrophic flu-like pandemic. What is the likelihood that it could go wrong unfortunately, there is no definite answer. Most researches on predicting
pandemic outbreaks use mathematical simulation paradigms; however, as stated
by Jewell et al (2009), there are various issues with these simulation tools. Late
detection of the infection, the probability that there are undetected infected
individuals who are not included in the data, and providing predictions based on
only past epidemics or pandemics are some of these issues. For instance, one of
the latest researches done on predicting the H1N1 influenza virus that uses a
simulation model has a confidence level of 95% (Towers and Feng, 2009), and
the researchers state that the studies on the periodic functions underlying seasonal
forcing of influenza are not sufficient, and the uncertainties that arise from this is
not quantifiable yet.
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Even at the onset, the RST study (or any risk management study for that
matter) has all the underpinnings of a wicked problem. Though no published
document explicitly describes a risk management problem as a wicked problem,
Hofstetter et al. (2002) and Pinto et al. (2004) describe some strong indicators:
• Risk can transcend through elements of a system, as well as beyond the
system boundaries.
• Planning for risk often needs information about future events, which by its
very nature is dynamic and uncertain.
• Emergence of additional risks resulting from the actions of managing the
original risk of interest (aka countervailing risk).
• Emergence of desirable consequence other than simply reducing the
original risk of interest (aka synergistic effect).
• That these emerging countervailing risks and synergistic effects come in
various forms, magnified as time passes, and may have various effects for
various perspectives (aka the ripples-in-the-pond effect).
4.1

Risk Management Approach and Wicked Problems

Rittel and Weber (1973) initially proposed the term “wicked” to describe
problems which are inherently complex. In their 1973 paper, they present ten
major characteristics that wicked problems possess:
1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad.
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked
problem.
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a "one-shot operation"; because
there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts
significantly.
6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively
describable) set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of
permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan.
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique.
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another
problem.
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be
explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the
nature of the problem's resolution.
10. The planner has no right to be wrong.
Wicked problems have been a vital component within various research
areas, including homeland security (Kendra, et al, 2008; Rubin, 2009), and is
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closely related to uncertainty. Uncertainty can be defined as “the inability to
determine the true state of affairs of a system” (Haimes, 2004, pg. 237). This
inability may have different sources, including lack of information, incorrect
information, the ambiguous nature of the environment, limited understanding of a
process, among others. The uniqueness of each wicked problem, lack of correct
solutions to the problem, and the fact that there is no learning opportunity puts the
wicked problems in an “uncertainty” context.
The two main sources of uncertainty, according to Haimes (2004), are
variability and knowledge. Both of these sources are present within the project
currently at hand. In order to correctly and successfully implement the Rapid
Sensor Technology, detailed information on both the technology itself, and also
the implications of this implementation is needed. This, as stated previously by
Pinto et al (2004), becomes a dynamic and uncertain situation. Unpredictability
(or randomness), which is another parameter of uncertainty (Morgan and Henrion,
1990), is also part of the nature of a wicked problem. Even though detailed
planning and forecasting is a major component of implementing the RST, the
unpredictable nature of a pandemic may create an additional level of complexity.
RST is definitely not the only technology that can be used to manage the
risk of flu-type pandemic. However, for RST to even make a contribution towards
the management of this particular type of risk, many scenarios have to be
considered and acted upon accordingly. Exactly how many scenarios need to be
analyzed?
As Kaplan and Garrick (1981) and Kaplan (1997) emphasized, all
scenarios need to be analyzed to accurately quantify risk, an otherwise very
abstract concept. However, most risk managers will admit that not all scenarios
can be identified, much less be analyzed. As such, all quantitative risk
measurement is a best-effort endeavor - meaning that the risk analyst will exert
the best effort to accurately quantify risk subject to the usual constraints of
resources and irreducible uncertainty.
This limitation is further exacerbated by the difficult and complex nature
of wicked problems, with all of the accompanying properties. On the other hand,
practitioners and researchers have responded to the realization that risk
management is a best-effort endeavor in two ways: 1) by more efficient
identification of scenarios and 2) by more efficient allocation of resources among
identified scenarios. This brings to light what Rittel (1972) identified as some
principles of the second generation systems approach, particularly the need for a
multidisciplinary approach
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Risk Management and Systems Approach

It is noticeable that the six questions in the RMA have close semblance to the
phases of a general systems approach to solving problems, except that particular
interest in RMA is not the desired outcome but the wrong event, e.g. asking “what
can go wrong” instead of “what needs to be right”. As such, one can surmise that
if special interest is on how RMA addresses wicked problems, then many if not
all shortcomings of the systems approach in addressing such type of problems
must also be present in the RMA.
Rittel (1972) described in length the shortcomings of the first generation
systems approach. Furthermore, he also described how to deal with wicked
problems embodied into the principles of the so-called second-generation systems
approach. The following sections explore some of these shortcomings as reflected
to RMA and what has been done to address them towards mastering wicked risk
management problems.
4.3

Multi-disciplinary Risk Management Approach

In trying to avoid a flu-type pandemic by effectively using RST, the analysis goes
beyond the technical study of the actual physical RST but rather extends farther to
the realm of epidemiology and virology (how the flu virus is transmitted), the
practice of medical triage (what actions needs to be taken after indications of flu
incidents), medical practice management (scaling up resources right before a
pandemic, see Figure 1), and a host of other domains. All these domains
essentially need to be represented at the very early stage of the risk management
process related to RST.
There has been recognition that most risk management problems
encompass diverse fields of discipline and domains of knowledge to the extent
that no one person can claim contextual expertise (Conrow, 2004). Flu-type
pandemic and the application of RST is definitely one example. As a result,
several tools and techniques such as the Surrogate Worth Tradeoff Method
(Haimes, et al. 1971; Haimes, et al. 1975), and the Hierarchical Holographic
Modeling (Haimes, 1981) have been proposed and used to help risk managers
involve many domains of knowledge i.e. so-called subject matter experts
throughout the various stages of the risk management process.
The underlying principle behind these tools and techniques is that by
involving more perspectives in the risk management process, more scenarios will
be identified in the same period of time. Having identified many scenarios
produces more robust alternatives and solutions at the tail end of the risk
management process. The abundance of perspectives also has the tendency to
dilute whatever bias the analyst may have (Sharit, 2000).
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However, simply having a robust set of alternatives to mitigate risks does
not imply that risks will be effectively managed. In fact, a robust, i.e. larger set of
alternatives burdens the risk manager to discriminate and compare among more
alternatives in terms of their potential to reduce overall risk. As such, another
concern for the risk manager is the allocation of limited resources among the
identified alternatives to mitigate various scenarios.
5

EFFICIENT RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN RMA

In analyzing how RST can be effectively deployed to prevent a flu-type
pandemic, the team of researchers have identified that aside from a more
sophisticated sensor, another critical factor for effectiveness is a reliable and fast
communication infrastructure to relay information from the RST to laboratory
technicians and eventually to medical emergency managers (e.g. CDC). And there
are other factors identified that are all essential for effective deployment of RST,
more often organizational rather than purely technical in nature. The next question
for the team then becomes how to discern the relative importance of these factors
in minimizing the risk of flu-type pandemic.
Various methods for more efficient allocation of risk management
resources have been devised, such as risks ranking and filtering (e.g. Leung, et al.
2004), or some form of pseudo-efficient investment allocation (e.g. Arora, et al.
2004, Pinto and Pathak, 2008). These types of tools compares alternatives by
rating them based on a set of criteria that are expressive of how each one can
reduce the total risk.
Another property of any risk management activity is the inherent difficulty
of consistently gauging the relative importance of risks. This is particularly
relevant in the context of flu-type pandemic where controversial and alarming
media coverage may lead to an over-estimated risk judgment, effectively resulting
in irrational risk-averse decisions. Alhakami and Slovic (1994) have identified
several psychological factors in an individual or societal judgment on risk that
have relevance in the context of RST. Some of these are:
• Inverse relationship between risk & benefit judgment (e.g. someone who
views flu vaccine to be risky will also view it to have minimal benefits)
• Halo effect when people judge risk in terms of general attitude and not by
objective means (e.g. someone who views face mask as effective
deterrence because many people wear them rather than actual test results)
• Cognitive consistency when people try to be consistent, something
beneficial may also be viewed as having low risk – not by objective
means.
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CONCLUSION

Ivnitski et al (2006) very clearly describes the shortcomings of conventional
biodetection systems: The slow rate of recognition of the presence of a pathogen,
the inability to discriminate a full set of pathogenic versus nonpathogenic
microorganisms in the environment, inadequate sensitivity, non-portability, the
need for highly trained and qualified personnel and the high cost of purchase,
maintenance and operation. The RST under study in this research will eliminate
some of these shortcomings. First of all, the main objective and focus of this new
technology is to increase the rate of detection of any kind of virus that may cause
a threat. Both by decreasing the detection time and also by-passing some of the
steps-such as physician control, etc- will be of help in this rapid technology. The
need for additional personnel was discussed in the previous section, but because
this effort will be interrelated, the new personnel need not be employed by the
hospital.
It has been addressed in this paper that the implementation of RST will
also have an impact on standard operation procedures of the medical, business,
government and military infrastructures. In search of ways to master wicked
problems, the RST research team looked at how risk management approach deals
with wicked problems and complexity. RMA has similarities with the systems
approach to solving problems and shares a number of its shortcoming in dealing
with wicked problems. The initial source of complexity is the abstract and highly
conceptual nature of risk. The quantitative description of risk also brings forth the
fact that not all risk can be managed. In response, practitioners and researchers
have suggested tools, methods, techniques, and paradigm shifts aids in
implementing multi-disciplinary risk management as wells as more efficient
allocation of resources to risk mitigation alternatives. However, there are still a lot
of challenges that need to be addressed, including the organizational factors in
RMA, as well as the inherent nature of risk to transcend elemental, system, and
even meta-system boundaries.
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